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en assessing protection needs, my approach has been to determine what the
isks are, what injuries result and then
decide how to minimize these risks and protect against
any residual danger. I also bear in mind that there is
no point in prescribing an action or a garment that
will nor be used.
Though this method may be practical, it is not
an approach endorsed by the protective equipment
industry, which seems to prefer co base their assessment of risk on experimental data and a scale of injury used in the aucomobile industry. If the injuries
they commonly predicted were accurate, all of the
deminer victims l know would be dead. Most of them
are at work.
Anyone considering this matter objectively
should bear in mind that deminers do nor want co
wear any equipment that is uncomfortable, heavy, restrictive of movement or thought to be unnecessary.
Demining program managers do nor wam co buy
equipment that will not be used or is expensive to
purchase and replace. They also are aware that
demining incidents are extremely rare. I believe that
severe incidents occur at the rare of one per 25-30
years of actual demining experience for each deminer.
This statement ignores the fact that some groups have
more incidents or work in more dangerous areas than
others, but it does explai n why most deminers have
never seen an incident.
The following paper draws on information derived from five years of field research and from an
inti mare knowledge of the incident data in rhe Database of Demining Incident Victims (DDIV). The
DDIV stems from my work during 1998 and 1999
for the U .S. Army CECOM NVESD Humanitarian
Demining research initiative. It covers all recorded
explosive incidents that have occurred while demining
in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, BosniaHerzegovina, Laos and Zimbabwe. It also covers all
the usefully recorded incidents that occurred in Afghanistan (1997-99) and those made available from
Kosovo. It does not include derails of civilian incidents
and injuries. Often with considerable derail about the
circumstances surrounding an incident, the records
provide a reference for an informed analysis.
The DDIV has been accepted as an authoritative resource by GICHD in irs work advising therevision of UN standards for HD. The DDIV is available on CD.
Eye injury is common and easy to avoid.

Threat activities
There are many opinions of what constitutes the
greatest threat in demining. Using the DDIV as a
data resource, it is possible to reduce the perceived
threats to those that have a real man ifestation. The
"threats" are listed in terms of incident types and frequency.

Type ofincident

Number of
victims

Excavation . .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ....... I .1 9
Missed-mine ................................ 85
Handling ..................................... 32
Victim inattencion ....................... 25
Detectiot1/tripwire ........... ............ 18
Survey ....... ................................... 16
Vegetation removal ...... ................ 12
Other .... ....................................... 10
Demolition ...... ..................... ......... 7
Detection ........... ................. .. .. ....... 6

Leg/foot
Severe leg 40, minor 94
Severe foot 17, minor 10
Amputation of leg 63
Amputation of foot 9
Amputation of roes 1
Total: 130 severe injuries
Body/trunk
Severe body 13, minor 36
Severe chest 18, minor 37
Severe genital 11, minor 5
Total: 42 severe injuries
The table reveals that there are more severe lower
limb injuries than any other. What is not immediately obvious is that the most common type of incident, "excavation ," rarely involves any lower limb
injury. This fact is explained because lower limb injuries tend to be disproportionately severe.

Devices Involved
One can see that "excavation" is the most frequent
incident to occur. The second most likely type is a
"missed-mine"; it involves a deminer stepping on a
device missed during clearance. The essential difference is that rhe first is deliberate (the detector reading
must be exposed by excavation) while the second is
accidental (no one intended to miss the mine). In the
first case, the victim is doing what must be done; in
the second, he is the victim of someone else's mistakes.

Injuries Sustained
In the DDIV, injuries likely to be life-threatening to require surgery or result in permanent disability are rated as severe. All others are rated as minor.
For the whole database2 the following injuries
are recorded:

Face/head/neck
Severe eye 60, minor 37
Severe face 19, minor 100
Severe head 17, minor 16
Severe neck 5, minor 23
TotaL 101 severe injuries
Hand/arm
Severe hand 34, minor 84
Amputation of hand 8
Amputation of finger 26
Severe arm 25, minor 66
Amputation of arm 13
Total: I 06 severe injuries

l am defining the threat as the mine(s)/devices
most commonly occurring in recorded incidents in
any one theater and omitting the AT mine threat. The
DDIV includes records of two incidents involving an
AT mine, both were fatal. Such cases being rare and
seemingly impossible to protect against, I have left
them out of this analysis.

The Blast Mine Threat
Mghanistan- PMN (240g TNT) mine featured
in 62 injuries.
Angola- PPM-2 (liOg TNT) mine featured in
12 injuries (PMN in six).
Bosnia-Herzegovina- PMA-3 (35gTetryl) mine
featured in seven injuries; the PMA-2 (1 OOg TNT)
mine featured in five injuries.
Cambodia- PMN-2 mine featured in at least
2 1; the "minimum metal" mines Type 72 (a or b) (5 1g
TNT) featured in 13; and the M14 and MD82B (27/
28g) featured in eight (total of 21 minimum metal
mines).
Iraq - the PMN (240g TNT) mine featured in
five injuries.
Laos- none recorded.
Kosovo - the PMA-rwo mines featured in four
111JUrleS.
Mozambique - PMN (240g TNT) mine featured in 14 injuries.
Zimbabwe- R2M2 (58g RDX/WAX) mine featured in 10 injuries.
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In half of the countries, the PMN and/or PMN2 represent the largest AP blast threats.

The Fragmentation Mine Threat
Afghanistan - POMZ (75g TNT ) mine featured in I 0 fragmentation injuries.
Angola - POMZ (75g TNT) mine featured in
one fragmentation injury.
Bosnia-Herz.egovina - PROM- I (425g T NT )
mine featured in 17 (all) fragmentation injuries.
Cambodia - PO MZ (75g T NT) mine featured
in one fragmentatio n injury.
Iraq - Yalmara-69 (450g Com p B) featured in
three injuri es (PROM- I also featured in two of
these).
Kosovo - no fragmenta tio n injuries are recorded
(still waiting fo r data).
Laos - a mo rtar featured in the only recorded
jury.
Mozambique - OZM-4 (170g TNT ) mine featured in seve n o r eight fragmentation injuries.
Zimbabwe - none recorded.
T he PROM- 1, OZM-4 and POMZ represe nt
the greatest threat (in that o rder), but the PRO M - 1
does not featu re in the data fo r Cambodia, Afghan istan, Laos, Kosovo, Zim babwe, Angola or
Mozamb ique. Of those cou ntries, it is known to be
common in Kosovo.
Ill

The Ordnance Threat

3

Afghanistan - a fuse fea tured in nine (of 12)
ordnance related injuries.
Angola - no ordnance related injuries are reco rded.
Bosnia-Herzegovina - a grenade featured in the
only ord nance related injury recorded.
Cambodia - a fuse featured in fo ur (of four) ordnance related injuries.
Iraq - no ord nance related injuries are recorded.
Kosovo - no ordnance injuries are recorded (still
waiting for data).
Laos - phospho ro us from an inadequately destroyed mortar featu red in the only recorded injury.
Mozambique - a fuse featured in the on ly ordnance related injury.
Zimbabwe - no ordnance related injuries are reco rded, but AP mi ne fuses featured in two recorded
injuries.
Fuses are the most common cause of UXO injury with grenades being the next most co mmon.
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Reducing Risk
Most practical people accept that there are two
ways to reduce the risk of severe injury in an incident.
The first is to avoid the incident. The second is to
provide effective protective equipment to limit any
injury that occu rs.
Avoiding risk can be ach ieved by revisin g the
techniques used or by enforcing the application of operating proced ures known to be safe. The DDIV recorded 82 incidents where a primary cause was "management inadequacy"-usually the failure to provide
appropriate equ ipment o r trai ni ng. A further 190
incidents have "field co ntrol inadequacy," recorded as
their primary cause. In these cases, dem iners were not
working as directed by management, and their errors
were nor corrected by management. O ften they were
obeying their field su perviso rs! T hese listings show
that more than 82 percent of incidents may have been
avoidable if appropriate controls were in place. Even
allowing for revision downwards, this point illustrates
that atten ti on paid to imp roved management at all
levels could be an effective way to reduce severe injury.
W hen everything has been done to avoid an incident, provis ion must be made to protect against any
residual risk. The initial problem with this method is
that it is impossible to protect against the worst mines.
Bounding fragmentation mines are reported to spread
fragments at velocities up to 1,200 m/s; a speed more
than twice the size most body armors are capable of
withstanding and fo ur times the size the best visors
are capable of withstand ing. D eminers who trigger a
mine at close quarters invariably die whether or not
they were wearing protection. T he answer is to try
harder to avoid that risk. Strategies for th is approach
exist, such as cutting undergrowth with protected machines, avoid ing render-safe procedures using makeshift cli ps (a risk revealed by the D DIV) and generally keeping the deminer away from the th reat.
T he most common activity at the time of an incident is "excavation" of a detector read ing. Th is activity must be carried out, and explosions have occurred when no "mistake" was attributed to the vicrim. The "duty of care" of an employer requires that
the demi ner be protected appropriately when he is
working as directed on a req uired task such as this one.
The second most co mmo n incident involves
stepping on a "missed-mi ne." M issed-mine incidents
ind icate that clearance has not been effective. T hese
types of incidents sho uld never occu r. So me timeserved grou ps have not had any missed- min e incidents; others have had many. T h is fact implies that it

is possible to work in a way that avoids them. Incidentally, there is no evidence of a greater risk of missing a mine when demining in areas with minimum
metal mines. In the vast majority of missed-mine incidents, the m ine was a PMN , PMN-2 or PPM-2,
all of which have a large metal content. Even in Cambodia where min imum metal mines are relatively
common, as many demi ners have stepped on PMN2 mines as on all m inimum metal mines combined
(T72, M 14 and M D 82Bs). The evidence in the
DDIV sugges ts t hat the best defense against the
missed-mi ne risk is to avoid them by usi ng better
working methods and adequate supervision.
The next most common incident occurs when
handling a device, sometimes one believed to be safe.
Better training could alleviate ignorance, and some
groups could avoid the risk altogether by not allowing devices to be handled. Practical protection is impossible without introducing a barrier so thick that
the device becomes roo remote for tactile feedback.
Avoidance is the only open strategy.
The next most common incident is recorded as
"victim inattention." This type covers rimes when
deminers accidentally fall over a mine, walk into an
uncleared area or otherwise behave in a thoughtless
manner. While in some cases close supervision and
rigorous training might have prevented the incident,
it has to be accepted that moments of inattention will
occur. It is impossible to predict what an incident like
this will involve. The only practical protection seems
to be that which is used for other incidents.
The next most common incident is recorded as
"detection/tripwire." This type covers incidents where
a tripwi re was pulled or a deminer trod on a device
while clearing land (the area was not declared "clear"
at the ti me; so, the mine was not technically missed).
Failure of equipment and careless use of the detector
were the causes fo r these incidents. I believe that this
type is another case where protecting the deminer
would be best achieved by ensuring that the incident
did not occur.
The next most common incident is recorded as
"survey," which occurs when a survey is being made
or when a mine is in itiated in an area declared "free
from mines" or "reduced" during a survey. Most accidents involve mines that were missed during the
survey; so, improving the qual ity of survey would
have prevented most of them. No practical way of
protecting against the remaining risk is apparent.
The next most common incident is classified as
"vegetation removal." These incidents involve pull-

ing a tripwire while cutting vegetation or stepping our
of the safe area while doing so. Both could be avoided
by enforcing existing operating procedures or by using, where possible, mechanical means to cut the vegetation prior to manual demining. Given that the risk
includes the fragmentation mine threat, no practical
protection against it is possible.
The next most common incident classification
is "other." This type covers a range of isolated incidents with little in common. Several of the incidents
involve the apparent sickness of the victim, which
may be something spotted by the field management.
The next most common incident classification
is "demolition." This rype is rare
and happens when an explosive
injury occurs while charges are
being prepared or laid for the
demolition of a device(s) already
located. These incidents have included fragmentation mines. No
effective protection could have
been made available for some of
these incidents, and at least some
were caused by the victim breaching operating procedures. It
seems likely that improved training is the only practical way to reduce the number of
these incidents and the severity of damage to the
VICi tmS.

Of all the classifications mentioned above, the
only incident that occurs even when a deminer adheres ro his training and instructions is "excavation."
This type is also the most common incident. For these
two reasons, I believe it should provide the benchmark for protection needs.

Protection While Excavating
To protect a deminer against incidents that occur when excavati ng, we must be aware of the position he is in and the areas of his body most at risk.
Despite the claims of some ill-informed managers in
the industry, the data in the DDIV clearly illust rates
that almost all deminers work in a kneeling or squatring position while excavating. This news is good for
the deminer because he avoids the whiplash acceleration injuries that have been associated with deminers
in a stationary position with their heads only a few
centimeters from the blast origin. The exploding device is almost invariably directly in front of and below his body and head. Often, his hand is above or
alongside the device.
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Severe (disabling) Injuries Recorded
While Excavating
Face & neck= 54 severe injuries
Upper limb= 51 severe injuries
Lower limb= 7 severe injuries
Trunk/Body = 10 severe injuries
The difference in size berween the injuries to the
upper limbs and head (51-54) is statistically insignificant in a sample of this size. The drop to seven
for lower limb injuries is significant, as it illustrates
the way that a fragment cone rises from a seat of initiation and the core of it often misses the legs (minor leg injuries were more common- 36). The drop
to 10 for trunk/body injury is also significant, illustrating clearly that the main torso is not at the same
degree of risk as the upper limbs and the head. Several of the severe body injuries resulted from the tool,
or part of it, hitting the body.

Face and Neck Protection
Despite the fact that some form of eye protection was issued, it was not worn in almost half of the
recorded blast mine incidents. Eye injury accounted
for 97 of the 236 blast mine victims in the database
(more than one in three).
Eye protection issued varies from industrial
safety spectacles to 5mm polycarbonate visors. Safety
spectacles were issued to 25 percent of the victims in
the DDIV. In 33 percent of the cases, 3mm visors
were issued, and these visors sometimes shattered
(there were 19 severe eye injuries in excavation incidents over rwo years in that theater alone).
Visors made of 5mm thick untreated polycarbonate sheet that cover the face have been used by
most professional groups (MAG, HALO Trust, NPA
Mozambique & Angola, MgM, Koch MineSafe,
MineTech, INAROEE, etc.) for some years, and their
use is spreading. Some of the visors are short and attach to helmets, all too often leaving the wearer's
throat exposed (especially from below when kneeling). Others are long and worn without helmets.
When worn properly, these offer some protection to
the throat when kneeling and looking down.
I have tested 5mm untreated polycarbonate visors in over 40 blast tests using AP mines. They have
not failed catastrophically, but a 5mm visor did break
in two in one recorded incident. In one test, the
material was penetrated by a steel fragment placed
in the earth covering the mine. In several further tests
against POMZ fragmentation mines, rhe visor was
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not penetrated at all, illustrating the unpredictability
of mines but also showing that 5mm polycarbonate
does not guarantee protection to a deminer excavating an AP blast mine. A full-face visor made of polycarbonate is light enough for sustained wear (thousands of deminers use them) and is probably the best
that can be provided until a lighter, stronger material
is developed. This evidence suggests that 5mm polycarbonate full-face visors fixed in the "down" position
should be the standard for facial protection while excavating AP blast mines.

Upper Limb Protection
It is unconventional to pur hands and arms
among the areas needing protection. However, the
DDIV recorded 51 severe upper-limb injuries from
blast mine detonations, including 14 amputations of
fingers and hands and I 0 of arms. These injuries are
worse when the tool is short and used vertically. When
the tool breaks into its component parts, deminers
have been struck in the chest, upper arm and face with
severe consequences. At least five deminers died after
their hand-tool failed and fragmented in a blast.
There is also evidence in the DDIV that hand
and arm safety can be enhanced by using hand-shields
and sensible manuf.:tcturing constraints rhar keep a
tool in one piece. For example, in at least eight prodding incidents with a simple tool made in Africa, the
tool blade curved and the handle and blade stayed
together. In none of these incidents was the deminer
injured by his tool.
The evidence from the DDIV supports my belief that
• To prevent hand injury when excavating, tools
should be designed so that they are easiest to
use at a low angle to the ground; and
• To reduce hand and arm injury, tools should
be designed to stay in one piece, should be long
enough to keep the deminer's hand at least
30cm from the blast and should incorporate a
flexible blast shield whenever possible without
reducing utility.
Examples of such tools exist and are available
commercially.

Body Protection Against Fragmentation
Protection designed to reach a STANAG V50 of
450m/s (current U.N. standard) has proved less than
adequate against bounding fragmentation mines. Fortunately, fragmentation mine incidents are rare outside Europe, and there are no records of a bounding

fragme ntation mine incident occurring while exca-

No Protection Because of No Real Risk

vating.

There are a number of products available that
offer protection against questionable risks. Facts suggest that these risks are so rare that deminers feel that
protection against them is unnecessary.
There is no evidence among the data for overpressure internal injuries ("thoracic disruption") resulting from an AP mine. The evidence in the DDIV
proves beyond reasonable doubt that this "threat" is
more commercially conven ient than real. Presently,
there is no evidence to suggest that blast-proof boots
have reduced injury. Current evidence suggests that
wearing blast-boots when stepping on a blast mine
containing significantly more than 50g HE may actually worsen rhe level of severe injury. Also, the o nly

Body Protection Against Blast
T he D D IV recorded 14 deminers dead as a result of blast mine detonations. Five of these victims
were wearing frag-jackets of some kind, bur all five
were not wearing head protection (or nor wearing it
properly). Additionally, four of these involved severe
head-injury; the fifth deminer was squatting and
stepped on a mine so he suffered severe lower body
inj ury. The frag-jacket did not appear to have "failed"
in any of these cases. In excavation incidents where
armor was worn, it did not fail; thus, the DDIV provides evidence that the STANAG 450m/s current
standard of body protection is sufficient against the
largest blast-mine threat (240g TNT) at a distance

"No protective equipment I
have seen used in
humanitarian demining Ctln
guarantee protection against a
bounding.fragmentation mine. "
-Andy Smith
Pho10 c/o Andy Smith

of 30cm.
However, a STANAG V50 of 450m/s is no measure of blast protection. A blast mine detonation is a
sign ificantly different kind of threat, and the materials used to protect against it may not have the same
fragmentation resistance despite being more effective
against a blast mine detonation. An example of this
situation is the low cost, flexible ballistic Aramid; it
retains its integrity in a blast better than Kevlar, but
it has a much lower V50, weight for weight.
As the data in the DDIV shows, the armor currently issued is nor always worn. Deminers tell me
that because it is heavy and uncomfortable, they feel
that the bulkiness of the gear may increase their
chances of making a mistake. This assertion explains
why there has been a general move away from flakjackets toward frontal "aprons." Some of the aprons
hang loose while others are strapped firmly to the
body. Some aprons have a V50 as low as 380m/s; others exceed 450m/s. The only type to fail in my tests
had the higher V50, but it was made up of discrete
panels that rhe blast separated. Conversely, the onepiece apron with a lower V50 performed well in seven
tests and in at least 15 real incidents.
The evidence shows that the need for body protection may not be a high priority, but it is desirable.
It is even more desirable if it is comfortable enough
fo r a deminer to wear. Simple blast resistant frontal
aprons have proved adequate to protect an excavating deminer in real incidents and comfortable enough
to be worn without protest. Thus, the evidence suggesrs that deminers should be issued frontal body and
genital blast protection aprons (240g TNT at 30cm)
when excavating.

• 35.

Focus
boots with some effectiveness against the smallest
mines include a stand-off of at least 10 linear em in
their design. These boots would be impractical in the
mined environments I know. There is no evidence
in the DDIV that wearing a helmet or a back-panel
to body armor has ever significantly reduced theseverity of an injury.
Protection against hearing loss is sometimes suggested. While there have been many claims of hearing damage from single blasts in Afghanistan , this
case has nor appeared in other theaters. The compensation system in Afghanistan claims for low level and
unverifiable ear damage (deminers could still return
to work). Excluding Afghanistan, the DDIV lists only
one claim of severe hearing damage resulting from a
single blast (close proximity to a large device).

Practical Approaches to Meeting Deminer
Protection Needs:
• Reducing the number of incidents that occur,
and
• Reducing the severity of injury when an incident occurs.
The first can be pursued via changes ro working methods and improved supervision and management. This approach is likely to be the most effective. The second can be pursued via the provision of
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) appropriate for
use at times when risk cannot be avoided.

Practical PPE That Could Reduce the Severity
of Incidents:
• Eye protection with a STANAG V50 equal to
that offered by untreated 5mm polycarbonate
(about 280m/s). This equipment must be in
good condition and not reduce clarity of vision
by more than I 0 percent;
• Hand-tools rhat are fit for a purpose and are
designed to minimize the risk of adding to injury; and
• Comfortable frontal blast protection (against
240g TNT at 30cm) for use when excavating.
The inclusion of a collar that overlaps the visor and closes any access to the throat in a blast
is desirable.
Some groups already do most of the above. A few
of the organizations have done so for many years. This
report provides evidence that my suggestions are practical, and the DDfV provides evidence that they are
needed. •

CONQUERING THE
I NSURMOUNTABLE
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by Stephanie Schlosser and Virginia Saulnier, MAIC
1

These activities are defined in detail in the
DDIV.
2
Statistics are based on the April 2000 release of
the DDIV
3
Submunitions with Anti-Disturbance fuses,
frag-jackets and shaped-charges are a separate risk that
requires a distanced approach and specialized SOPs.
They have nor been featured in recorded incidents.

One Last Appeal
Please, let us not spend mine-clearance money on unnecessary
expensive equipment. Let us not load down a deminer with equipment
that he will discard as soon as our backs are turned. Please, let us not
ignore the facts just because they disturb our quest for profit.
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he Canadian Center for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) is a partnership of resources from rhe Department of National
Defense and Industry Canada. The Center is co-located with the Defense Research Establishment
Suffield (ORES) at Canadian Force Base Suffield in
Alberta.
CCMAT's mission is ro conduct research and
development oflow cost, sustainable technologies for
mine detection, mine neutralization, personal protection and victim assistance. The center also seeks
to find alternatives to anti-personnellandmines and
serve as an info rmation hub on humanitarian
demining technologies. CCMAT is a test and evaluation site for new ideas brought forward by the Canadian Industry and its partners.
After the CCMAT was established in August
1998, Dr. Denis Bergeron quickly assumed an active
role within the center. Previously, Or. Bergeron's
background at ORES had directed his focus to the
neutralization oflandmines; however, his interest has

since shifted to the protection of de miners against exploding landmines. During an interview with the
Journal, Dr. Bergeron offered candid responses concerning CCMAT's main objectives, their current
products and their vision for the future.

Despite the traditional
image ofstatic think
tanks and endless

Communication Venues
Dr. Bergeron spoke extensively of the flowing
web of communication present in the demining community, especially between Canada and the United
States with respect to SOLIC and Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the European demining organizations. "It's
been excellent cooperation on that side [Fort Belvoir).
There's also quite a bit of cooperation with the European community .... There is a very frequent exchange of information, keeping each other aware [of)
the progress." Maintaining open communication is
vital to the advancement of demining technologies,
as "there isn't enough money to try everything ... and
certainly you don't want to quench any of the ideas
that are coming out. However, you have to be selective as to pursuing which ones will actually make a
difference in the field."
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facts and figures,
technology is a
~iveactivhythat

only grows when one
new invention spurs
on the thought process
of another developer.

